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ow could we compare in respect of magnitude two principles of determination； the ideas of which depend upon different faculties； so as to prefer that which affects the faculty of desire in the highest degree。 The same man may return unread an instructive book which he cannot again obtain； in order not to miss a hunt； he may depart in the midst of a fine speech； in order not to be late for dinner； he may leave a rational conversation； such as he otherwise values highly； to take his place at the gaming…table； he may even repulse a poor man whom he at other times takes pleasure in benefiting； because he has only just enough money in his pocket to pay for his admission to the theatre。 If the determination of his will rests on the feeling of the agreeableness or disagreeableness that he expects from any cause； it is all the same to him by what sort of ideas he will be affected。 The only thing that concerns him； in order to decide his choice； is； how great； how long continued； how easily obtained； and how often repeated； this agreeableness is。 just as to the man who wants money to spend； it is all the same whether the gold was dug out of the mountain or washed out of the sand； provided it is everywhere accepted at the same value； so the man who cares only for the enjoyment of life does not ask whether the ideas are of the understanding or the senses； but only how much and how great pleasure they will give for the longest time。 It is only those that would gladly deny to pure reason the power of determining the will； without the presupposition of any feeling； who could deviate so far from their own exposition as to describe as quite heterogeneous what they have themselves previously brought under one and the same principle。 Thus； for example； it is observed that we can find pleasure in the mere exercise of power； in the consciousness of our strength of mind in overcoming obstacles which are opposed to our designs； in the culture of our mental talents； etc。； and we justly call these more refined pleasures and enjoyments； because they are more in our power than others； they do not wear out； but rather increase the capacity for further enjoyment of them； and while they delight they at the same time cultivate。 But to say on this account that they determine the will in a different way and not through sense； whereas the possibility of the pleasure presupposes a feeling for it implanted in us； which is the first condition of this satisfaction； this is just as when ignorant persons that like to dabble in metaphysics imagine matter so subtle； so supersubtle that they almost make themselves giddy with it； and then think that in this way they have conceived it as a spiritual and yet extended being。 If with Epicurus we make virtue determine the will only by means of the pleasure it promises； we cannot afterwards blame him for holding that this pleasure is of the same kind as those of the coarsest senses。 For we have no reason whatever to charge him with holding that the ideas by which this feeling is excited in us belong merely to the bodily senses。 As far as can be conjectured； he sought the source of many of them in the use of the higher cognitive faculty； but this did not prevent him； and could not prevent him； from holding on the principle above stated； that the pleasure itself which those intellectual ideas give us； and by which alone they can determine the will； is just of the same kind。 Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher； and yet the most rarely found。 The ancient Greek schools give us more examples of it than we find in our syncretistic age； in which a certain shallow and dishonest system of compromise of contradictory principles is devised； because it commends itself better to a public which is content to know something of everything and nothing thoroughly； so as to please every party。 The principle of private happiness； however much understanding and reason may be used in it； cannot contain any other determining principles for the will than those which belong to the lower desires； and either there are no ＇higher＇ desires at all； or pure reason must of itself alone be practical； that is； it must be able to determine the will by the mere form of the practical rule without supposing any feeling； and consequently without any idea of the pleasant or unpleasant； which is the matter of the desire； and which is always an empirical condition of the principles。 Then only； when reason of itself determines the will （not as the servant of the inclination）； it is really a higher desire to which that which is pathologically determined is subordinate； and is really； and even specifically； distinct from the latter； so that even the slightest admixture of the motives of the latter impairs its strength and superiority； just as in a mathematical demonstration the least empirical condition would degrade and destroy its force and value。 Reason； with its practical law； determines the will immediately； not by means of an intervening feeling of pleasure or pain； not even of pleasure in the law itself； and it is only because it can； as pure reason； be practical； that it is possible for it to be legislative。
REMARK II。
To be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational being； and this； therefore； is inevitably a determining principle of its faculty of desire。 For we are not in possession originally of satisfaction with our whole existence… a bliss which would imply a consciousness of our own independent self…sufficiency this is a problem imposed upon us by our own finite nature； because we have wants and these wants regard the matter of our desires； that is； something that is relative to a subjective feeling of pleasure or pain； which determines what we need in order to be satisfied with our condition。 But just because this material principle of determination can only be empirically known by the subject； it is impossible to regard this problem as a law； for a law being objective must contain the very same principle of determination of the will in all cases and for all rational beings。 For； although the notion of happiness is in every case the foundation of practical relation of the objects to the desires； yet it is only a general name for the subjective determining principles； and determines nothing specifically； whereas this is what alone we are concerned with in this practical problem； which cannot be solved at all without such specific determination。 For it is every man's own special feeling of pleasure and pain that decides in what he is to place his happiness； and even in the same subject this will vary with the difference of his wants according as this feeling changes； and thus a law which is subjectively necessary （as a law of nature） is objectively a very contingent practical principle； which can and must be very different in different subjects and therefore can never furnish a law； since； in the desire for happiness it is not the form （of conformity to law） that is decisive； but simply the matter； namely； whether I am to expect pleasure in following the law； and how much。 Principles of self…love may； indeed； contain universal precepts of skill （how to find means to accomplish one's purpose）； but in that case they are merely theoretical principles；* as； for example； how he who would like to eat bread should contrive a mill； but practical precepts founded on them can never be universal； for the determining principle of the desire is based on the feeling pleasure and pain； which can never be supposed to be universally directed to the same objects。
*Propositions which in mathematics or physics are called practical ought properly to be called technical。 For they For they have nothing to do with the determination of the theoretical they only point out how the certain must is to be produced and are； therefore； just as theoretical as any propositions which express the connection of a cause with an effect。 Now whoever chooses the effect must also choose the cause。
Even supposing； however； that all finite rational beings were thoroughly agreed as to what were the objects of their feelings of pleasure and pain； and also as to the means which they must employ to attain the one and avoid the other； sti