vill2-第2章

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t　as　incident　to　any　particular　lands。　And　there　can　be　no　doubt　that　it　was　used　in　the　same　sense　for　the　possession　of　a　villein。'　（Middle　Ages；　iii。　173；　cf。　note　XIV。）　Hallam's　statement　did　not　carry　conviction　with　it　however；　and　as　the　question　is　of　considerable　importance　in　itself　and　its　discussion　will　incidentally　help　to　bring　out　one　of　the　chief　points　about　villainage；　I　may　be　allowed　to　go　into　it　at　some　length。　　　　　Matters　would　be　greatly　simplified　if　the　distinction　could　really　be　traced　through　the　authorities。　In　point　of　fact　it　turns　out　to　be　a　late　one。　We　may　start　from　Coke　in　tracing　back　its　history。　His　commentary　upon　Littleton　certainly　has　a　passage　which　shows　that　he　came　across　opinions　implying　a　difference　of　status　between　villains　regardant　and　villains　in　gross。　He　speaks　of　the　right　of　the　villain　to　pursue　every　kind　of　action　against　every　person　except　his　lord；　and　adds：　'there　is　no　diversity　herein；　whether　he　be　a　villain　regardant　or　in　gross；　although　some　have　said　to　the　contrary；*　（Co。　Lit。　123　b）。　Littleton　himself　treats　of　the　terms　in　several　sections；　and　it　is　clear　that　he　never　takes　them　to　indicate　status　or　define　variation　of　condition。　As　has　been　pointed　out　by　Hallam；　he　uses　them　only　in　connexion　with　a　diversity　in　title；　and　a　consequent　diversity　in　the　mode　of　pleading。　If　the　lord　has　a　deed　or　a　recorded　confession　to　prove　a　man's　bondage；　he　may　implead　him　as　his　villain　in　gross；　if　the　lord　has　to　rely　upon　prescription；　he　has　to　point　out　the　manor　to　which　the　party　and　his　ancestors　have　been　regardant；　have　belonged；　time　out　of　mind。*　As　it　is　a　question　of　title　and　not　of　condition；　Littleton　currently　uses　the　mere　'villain'　without　any　qualification；　whereas　such　a　qualification　could　not　be　dispensed　with；　if　there　had　been　really　two　different　classes　of　villains。　Last　but　not　least；　any　thought　of　a　diversity　of　condition　is　precluded　by　the　fact；　that　Littleton　assumes　the　transfer　from　one　sub…division　to　the　other　to　depend　entirely　on　the　free　will　of　the　lord　（sections　175；　181；　182；　185）。　But　still；　although　even　Littleton　does　not　countenance　the　classification　I　am　now　analysing；　it　seems　to　me　that　some　of　his　remarks　may　have　given　origin　to　the　prevalent　misconception　on　the　subject。　　　　　Let　us　take　up　the　Year　Books；　which；　even　in　their　present　state；　afford　such　an　inestimable　source　of　information　for　the　history　of　legal　conceptions　in　the　fourteenth　and　fifteenth　centuries。　An　examination　of　the　reports　in　the　age　of　the　Edwards　will　show　at　once　that　the　terms　regardant　and　in　gross　are　used；　or　rather　come　into　use；　in　the　fourteenth　century　as　definitions　of　the　mode　of　pleading　in　particular　cases。　They　are　suggested　by　difference　in　title；　but　they　do　not　coincide　with　it；　and　any　attempt　to　make　them　coincide　must　certainly　lead　to　misapprehension。　I　mean　this　the　term　'villain　regardant'　applied　to　a　man　does　not　imply　that　the　person　in　question　has　any　status　superior　to　that　of　the　'villain　in　gross；'　and　it　does　not　imply　that　the　lord　has　acquired　a　title　to　him　by　some　particular　mode　of　acquisition；　e。g。　by　prescription　as　contrasted　with　grant　or　confession；　it　simply　implies　that　for　the　purpose　of　the　matter　then　in　hand；　for　the　purpose　of　the　case　that　is　then　being　argued；　the　lord　is　asserting　and　hoping　to　prove　a　title　to　the　villain　by　relying　on　a　title　to　a　manor　with　which　the　villain　is　or　has　been　connected…title　it　must　be　remembered　is　one　thing；　proof　of　title　is　another。　As　the　contrast　is　based　on　pleading　and　not　on　title；　one　and　the　same　person　may　be　taken　and　described　in　one　case　as　a　villain　regardant　to　a　manor；　and　in　another　as　a　villain　in　gross。　And　now　for　the　proof。　　　　　The　expression　'regardant'　never　occurs　in　the　pleadings　at　all；　but　'regardant　to　a　manor'　is　used　often。　From　Edward　III's　time　it　is　used　quite　as　a　matter　of　course　in　the　formula　of　the　'exceptio'　or　special　plea　of　villainage。*　That　is；　if　the　defendant　pleaded　in　bar　of　an　action　that　the　plaintiff　was　his　bondman　he　generally　said；　I　am　not　bound　to　answer　A；　because　he　is　my　villain　and　I　am　seised　of　him　as　of　my　villain　as　regardant　to　my　manor　of　C。　Of　course　there　are　other　cases　when　the　term　is　employed；　but　the　plea　in　bar　is　by　far　the　most　common　one　and　may　stand　for　a　test。　This　manner　of　pleading　is　only　coming　gradually　into　use　in　the　fourteenth　century；　and　we　actually　see　how　it　is　taking　shape　and　spreading。　As　a　rule　the　Year　Books　of　Edward　I's　time　have　not　got　it。　The　defendant　puts　in　his　plea　unqualified。　'He　ought　not　to　be　answered　because　he　is　our　villain'　（Y。B。　21/22　Edward　I；　p。　166；　ed。　Horwood）。　There　is　a　case　in　1313　when　a　preliminary　skirmish　between　the　counsel　on　either　side　took　place　as　to　the　sufficiency　of　the　defendant's　plea　in　bar；　the　plaintiff　contending　that　it　was　not　precise　enough。　Here；　if　any　where；　we　should　expect　the　term　'regardant；'　but　it　is　not　forthcoming1。　What　is　more；　and　what　ought　to　have　prevented　any　mistake；　the　official　records　of　trials　on　the　Plea　Rolls　up　to　Edward　II　always　use　the　plain　assertion；　'villanus。。。　et　tenet　in　villenagio。'*　The　practice　of　naming　the　manor　to　which　a　villain　belonged　begins　however　to　come　in　during　the　reign　of　Edward　II；　and　the　terminology　is　by　no　means　settled　at　the　outset；　expressions　are　often　used　as　equivalent　to　'regardant'　which　could　hardly　have　misled　later　antiquaries　as　to　the　meaning　of　the　qualification。*　In　a　case　of　1322；　for　instance；　we　have　'within　the　manor'　where　we　should　expect　to　find　'regardant　to　the　manor。'*　This　would　be　very　nearly　equivalent　to　the　Latin　formula　adopted　by　the　Plea　Rolls；　which　is　simply　ut　de　manerio。*　Every　now　and　then　cases　occur　which　gradually　settle　the　terminology；　because　the　weight　of　legal　argumentation　in　them　is　made　to　turn　on　the　fact　that　a　particular　person　was　connected　with　a　particular　manor　and　not　with　another。　A　case　from　1317　is　well　in　point。　B。P。　the　defendant　excepts　against　the　plaintiff　T。A。　on　the　ground　of　villainage　（qil　est　nostre　vileyn；　and　nothing　else）。　The　plaintiff　replies　that　he　was　enfranchised　by　being　suffered　to　plead　in　an　assize　of　mort　d'ancestor　against　B。P。's　grandmother。　By　this　the　defendant's　counsel　is　driven　to　maintain　that　his　client's　right　against　T。A。　descended　not　from　his　grandmother　but　from　his　grandfather；　who　was　seised　of　the　manor　of　H。　to　which　T。A。　belonged　as　a　villain。*　The　connexion　with　the　manor　is　adduced　to　show　from　what　quarter　the　right　to　the　villain　had　descended；　and；　of　course；　implies　nothing　as　to　any　peculiarity　of　this　villain's　status；　or　as　to　the　kind　of　title；　the　mode　of　acquiring　rights；　upon　which　the　lord　relies　　it　was　ground　common　to　both　parties　that　if　the　lord　had　any　rights　at　all　he　acquired　them　by　inheritance。　　　　　Another　case　seems　even　more　interesting。　It　dates　from　1355；　that　is　from　a　time　when　the　usual　terminology　had　already　become　fixed。　It　arose　under　that　celebrated　Statute　of　Labourers　which　played　such　a　prominent　part　in　the　social　history　of　the　fourteenth　century。　One　of　the　difficulties　in　working　the　statute　came　from　the　fact　that　it　had　to　recognise　two　different　sets　of　relations　between　the　employer　and　the　workman。　The　statute　dealt　with　the　contract　between　master　and　servant；　but　it　did　not　do　away　with　the　dependence　of　the　villain　on　the　lord；　and　in　case　of　conflict　it　gave　precedence　to　this　latter　claim；　a　lord　had　the　right　to　withdraw　his　villain　from　a　stranger's　service。　Such　cross　influences　could　not　but　occasion　a　great　deal　of　confusion；　and　our　case　gives　a　good　instance　of　it。　Thomas　Barentyn　has　reclaimed　Ralph　Crips　from　the　service　of　the　Prior　of　the　Hospitalers；　and　the　employer　sues　in　consequence　both　his　former　servant　and　Barentyn。　This　last　answers；　that　the　servant　in　question　is　his　villain　regardant　to　the　manor　of　C。　The　plaintiffs　counsel　maintains　that　he　could　not　have　been　regardant　to　the　manor；　as　he　was　going　about　at　large　at　his　free　will　and　as　a　free　man；　for　this　reason　A。　the　former　owner　of　the　manor　was　never　seised　of　him；　and　not　being　seised　could　not　transfer　the　seis