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what I apprehend is not a little doubtful； that in some parts of
Asia this department of the public police is very properly
managed by the executive power； there is not the least
probability that； during the present state of things； it could be
tolerably managed by that power in any part of Europe。
Even those public works which are of such a nature that they
cannot afford any revenue for maintaining themselves； but of
which the conveniency is nearly confined to some particular place
or district； are always better maintained by a local or
provincial revenue； under the management of a local or provincial
administration； than by the general revenue of the state； of
which the executive power must always have the management。 Were
the streets of London to be lighted and paved at the expense of
the treasury； is there any probability that they would be so well
lighted and paved as they are at present； or even at so small an
expense？ The expense； besides； instead of being raised by a local
tax upon the inhabitants of each particular street； parish； or
district in London； would； in this case； be defrayed out of the
general revenue of the state； and would consequently be raised by
a tax upon all the inhabitants of the kingdom； of whom the
greater part derive no sort of benefit from the lighting and
paving of the streets of London。
The abuses which sometimes creep into the local and
provincial administration of a local and provincial revenue； how
enormous soever they may appear； are in reality； however； almost
always very trifling in comparison of those which commonly take
place in the administration and expenditure of the revenue of a
great empire。 They are； besides； much more easily corrected。
Under the local or provincial administration of the justices of
the peace in Great Britain； the six days' labour which the
country people are obliged to give to the reparation of the
highways is not always perhaps very judiciously applied； but it
is scarce ever exacted with any circumstances of cruelty or
oppression。 In France； under the administration of the
intendants； the application is not always more judicious； and the
exaction is frequently the most cruel and oppressive。 Such
Corvees； as they are called； make one of the principal
instruments of tyranny by which those officers chastise any
parish or communaute which has had the misfortune to fall under
their displeasure。
Of the Public Works and Institutions which are necessary for
facilitating particular Branches of Commerce。
The object of the public works and institutions above
mentioned is to facilitate commerce in general。 But in order to
facilitate some particular branches of it； particular
institutions are necessary； which again require a particular and
extraordinary expense。
Some particular branches of commerce； which are carried on
with barbarous and uncivilised nations； require extraordinary
protection。 An ordinary store or counting…house could give little
security to the goods of the merchants who trade to the western
coast of Africa。 To defend them from the barbarous natives； it is
necessary that the place where they are deposited should be； in
some measure； fortified。 The disorders in the government of
Indostan have been supposed to render a like precaution necessary
even among that mild and gentle people； and it was under pretence
of securing their persons and property from violence that both
the English and French East India Companies were allowed to erect
the first forts which they possessed in that country。 Among other
nations； whose vigorous government will suffer no strangers to
possess any fortified place within their territory； it may be
necessary to maintain some ambassador； minister； or counsel； who
may both decide； according to their own customs； the differences
arising among his own countrymen； and； in their disputes with the
natives； may； by means of his public character； interfere with
more authority； and afford them a more powerful protection； than
they could expect from any private man。 The interests of commerce
have frequently made it necessary to maintain ministers in
foreign countries where the purposes； either of war or alliance；
would not have required any。 The commerce of the Turkey Company
first occasioned the establishment of an ordinary ambassador at
Constantinople。 The first English embassies to Russia arose
altogether from commercial interests。 The constant interference
which those interests necessarily occasioned between the subjects
of the different states of Europe； has probably introduced the
custom of keeping； in all neighbouring countries； ambassadors or
ministers constantly resident even in the time of peace。 This
custom； unknown to ancient times； seems not to be older than the
end of the fifteenth or beginning of the sixteenth century； that
is； than the time when commerce first began to extend itself to
the greater part of the nations of Europe； and when they first
began to attend to its interests。
It seems not unreasonable that the extraordinary expense
which the protection of any particular branch of commerce may
occasion should be defrayed by a moderate tax upon that
particular branch； by a moderate fine； for example； to be paid by
the traders when they first enter into it； or； what is more
equal； by a particular duty of so much per cent upon the goods
which they either import into； or export out of； the particular
countries with which it is carried on。 The protection of trade in
general； from pirates and freebooters； is said to have given
occasion to the first institution of the duties of customs。 But；
if it was thought reasonable to lay a general tax upon trade； in
order to defray the expense of protecting trade in general； it
should seem equally reasonable to lay a particular tax upon a
particular branch of trade； in order to defray the extraordinary
expense of protecting that branch。
The protection of trade in general has always been
considered as essential to the defence of the commonwealth； and；
upon that account； a necessary part of the duty of the executive
power。 The collection and application of the general duties of
customs； therefore； have always been left to that power。 But the
protection of any particular branch of trade is a part of the
general protection of trade； a part； therefore； of the duty of
that power； and if nations always acted consistently； the
particular duties levied for the purposes of such particular
protection should always have been left equally to its disposal。
But in this respect； as well as in many others； nations have not
always acted consistently； and in the greater part of the
commercial states of Europe； particular companies of merchants
have had the address to persuade the legislature to entrust to
them the performance of this part of the duty of the sovereign；
together with all the powers which are necessarily connected with
it。
These companies； though they may； perhaps； have been useful
for the first introduction of some branches of commerce； by
making； at their own expense； an experiment which the state might
not think it prudent to make； have in the long run proved；
universally； either burdensome or useless； and have either
mismanaged or confined the trade。
When those companies do not trade upon a joint stock； but
are obliged to admit any person； properly qualified； upon paying
a certain fine； and agreeing to submit to the regulations of the
company； each member trading upon his own stock； and at his own
risk； they are called regulated companies。 When they trade upon a
joint stock； each member sharing in the common profit or loss in
proportion to his share in this stock； they are called joint
stock companies。 Such companies； whether regulated or joint
stock； sometimes have； and sometimes have not； exclusive
privileges。
Regulated companies resemble； in every resp