按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
people by painting； poetry； music； dancing； by all sorts of
dramatic representations and exhibitions； would easily dissipate；
in the greater part of them； that melancholy and gloomy humour
which is almost always the nurse of popular superstition and
enthusiasm。 Public diversions have always been the objects of
dread and hatred to all the fanatical promoters of those popular
frenzies。 The gaiety and good humour which those diversions
inspire were altogether inconsistent with that temper of mind
which was fittest for their purpose； or which they could best
work upon。 Dramatic representations； besides； frequently exposing
their artifices to public ridicule； and sometimes even to public
execration； were upon that account； more than all other
diversions； the objects of their peculiar abhorrence。
In a country where the law favoured the teachers of no one
religion more than those of another； it would not be necessary
that any of them should have any particular or immediate
dependency upon the sovereign or executive power； or that he
should have anything to do either in appointing or in dismissing
them from their offices。 In such a situation he would have no
occasion to give himself any concern about them； further than to
keep the peace among them in the same manner as among the rest of
his subjects； that is； to hinder them from persecuting； abusing；
or oppressing one another。 But it is quite otherwise in countries
where there is an established or governing religion。 The
sovereign can in this case never be secure unless he has the
means of influencing in a considerable degree the greater part of
the teachers of that religion。
The clergy of every established church constitute a great
incorporation。 They can act in concert； and pursue their interest
upon one plan and with one spirit； as much as if they were under
the direction of one man； and they are frequently； too； under
such direction。 Their interest as an incorporated body is never
the same with that of the sovereign； and is sometimes directly
opposite to it。 Their great interest is to maintain their
authority with the people； and this authority depends upon the
supposed certainty and importance of the whole doctrine which
they inculcate； and upon the supposed necessity of adopting every
part of it with the most implicit faith； in order to avoid
eternal misery。 Should the sovereign have the imprudence to
appear either to deride or doubt himself of the most trifling
part of their doctrine； or from humanity attempt to protect those
who did either the one or the other； the punctilious honour of a
clergy who have no sort of dependency upon him is immediately
provoked to proscribe him as a profane person； and to employ all
the terrors of religion in order to oblige the people to transfer
their allegiance to some more orthodox and obedient prince。
Should he oppose any of their pretensions or usurpations； the
danger is equally great。 The princes who have dared in this
manner to rebel against the church； over and above this crime of
rebellion have generally been charged； too； with the additional
crime of heresy； notwithstanding their solemn protestations of
their faith and humble submission to every tenet which she
thought proper to prescribe to them。 But the authority of
religion is superior to every other authority。 The fears which it
suggests conquer all other fears。 When the authorized teachers of
religion propagate through the great body of the people doctrines
subversive of the authority of the sovereign； it is by violence
only； or by the force of a standing army； that he can maintain
his authority。 Even a standing army cannot in this case give him
any lasting security； because if the soldiers are not foreigners；
which can seldom be the case； but drawn from the great body of
the people； which must almost always be the case； they are likely
to be soon corrupted by those very doctrines。 The revolutions
which the turbulence of the Greek clergy was continually
occasioning at Constantinople； as long as the eastern empire
subsisted； the convulsions which； during the course of several
centuries； the turbulence of the Roman clergy was continually
occasioning in every part of Europe； sufficiently demonstrate how
precarious and insecure must always be the situation of the
sovereign who has no proper means of influencing the clergy of
the established and governing religion of his country。
Articles of faith； as well as all other spiritual matters；
it is evident enough； are not within the proper department of a
temporal sovereign； who； though he may be very well qualified for
protecting； is seldom supposed to be so for instructing the
people。 With regard to such matters； therefore； his authority can
seldom be sufficient to counterbalance the united authority of
the clergy of the established church。 The public tranquillity；
however； and his own security； may frequently depend upon the
doctrines which they may think proper to propagate concerning
such matters。 As he can seldom directly oppose their decision；
therefore； with proper weight and authority； it is necessary that
he should be able to influence it； and be can influence it only
by the fears and expectations which he may excite in the greater
part of the individuals of the order。 Those fears and
expectations may consist in the fear of deprivation or other
punishment； and in the expectation of further preferment。
In all Christian churches the benefices of the clergy are a
sort of freeholds which they enjoy； not during pleasure； but
during life or good behaviour。 If they held them by a more
precarious tenure； and were liable to be turned out upon every
slight disobligation either of the sovereign or of his ministers；
it would perhaps be impossible for them to maintain their
authority with the people； who would then consider them as
mercenary dependents upon the court； in the security of whose
instructions they could no longer have any confidence。 But should
the sovereign attempt irregularly； and by violence； to deprive
any number of clergymen of their freeholds； on account； perhaps；
of their having propagated； with more than ordinary zeal； some
factious or seditious doctrine； he would only render； by such
persecution； both them and their doctrine ten times more popular；
and therefore ten times more troublesome and dangerous； than they
had been before。 Fear is in almost all cases a wretched
instrument of government； and ought in particular never to be
employed against any order of men who have the smallest
pretensions to independency。 To attempt to terrify them serves
only to irritate their bad humour； and to confirm them in an
opposition which more gentle usage perhaps might easily induce
them either to soften or to lay aside altogether。 The violence
which the French government usually employed in order to oblige
all their parliaments； or sovereign courts of justice； to
enregister any unpopular edict； very seldom succeeded。 The means
commonly employed； however； the imprisonment of all the
refractory members； one would think were forcible enough。 The
princes of the house of Stewart sometimes employed the like means
in order to influence some of the members of the Parliament of
England； and they generally found them equally intractable。 The
Parliament of England is now managed in another manner； and a
very small experiment which the Duke of Choiseul made about
twelve years ago upon the Parliament of Paris； demonstrated
sufficiently that all the parliaments of France might have been
managed still more easily in the same manner。 That experiment was
not pursued。 For though management and persuasion are always the
easiest and the safest instruments of governments； as force and
violence are the worst and the most dangerous； yet such； it
seems； is the natural insolence of man that he almost always
disdains to use the good instrument； except when he cannot or
dare