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our own； as if the opposition between the two judgements were logical； would be folly。 With the agreeable； therefore； the axiom holds good： Every one has his own taste （that of sense）。 The beautiful stands on quite a different footing。 It would； on the contrary； be ridiculous if any one who plumed himself on his taste were to think of justifying himself by saying： 〃This object （the building we see； the dress that person has on； the concert we hear； the poem submitted to our criticism） is beautiful for me。〃 For if it merely pleases him； be must not call it beautiful。 Many things may for him possess charm and agreeableness…no one cares about that； but when he puts a thing on a pedestal and calls it beautiful； he demands the same delight from others。 He judges not merely for himself； but for all men； and then speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things。 Thus he says the thing is beautiful； and it is not as if he counted on others agreeing in his judgement of liking owing to his having found them in such agreement on a number of occasions； but he demands this agreement of them。 He blames them if they judge differently； and denies them taste； which he still requires of them as something they ought to have； and to this extent it is not open to men to say： 〃Every one has his own taste。〃 This would be equivalent to saying that there is no such thing at all as taste； i。 e。； no aesthetic judgement capable of making a rightful claim upon the assent of all men。 Yet even in the case of the agreeable； we find that the estimates men form do betray a prevalent agreement among them； which leads to our crediting some with taste and denying it to others； and that； too； not as an organic sense but as a critical faculty in respect of the agreeable generally。 So of one who knows how to entertain his guests with pleasures （of enjoyment through all the senses） in such a way that one and all are pleased； we say that he has taste。 But the universality here is only understood in a comparative sense； and the rules that apply are； like all empirical rules； general only； not universal； the latter being what the judgement of taste upon the beautiful deals or claims to deal in。 It is a judgement in respect of sociability so far as resting on empirical rules。 In respect of the good； it is true that judgements also rightly assert a claim to validity for every one； but the good is only represented as an object of universal delight by means of a concept； which is the case neither with the agreeable nor the beautiful。
SS 8。 In a judgement of taste the universality of delight is only represented as subjective。
This particular form of the universality of an aesthetic judgement； which is to be met in a judgement of taste； is a significant feature； not for the logician certainly； but for the transcendental philosopher。 It calls for no small effort on his part to discover its origin； but in return it brings to light a property of our cognitive faculty which； without this analysis； would have remained unknown。 First； one must get firmly into one's mind that by the judgement of taste （upon the beautiful） the delight in an object is imputed to every one； yet without being founded on a concept （for then it would be the good）； and that this claim to universality is such an essential factor of a judgement by which we describe anything as beautiful； that were it not for its being present to the mind it would never enter into any one's head to use this expression； but everything that pleased without a concept would be ranked as agreeable。 For in respect of the agreeable； every one is allowed to have his own opinion； and no one insists upon others agreeing with his judgement of taste； which is what is invariably done in the judgement of taste about beauty。 The first of these I may call the taste of sense； the second； the taste of reflection： the first laying down judgements merely private； the second； on the other hand； judgements ostensibly of general validity （public）； but both alike being aesthetic （not practical） judgements about an object merely in respect of the bearings of its representation on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure。 Now it does seem strange that while with the taste of sense it is not alone experience that shows that its judgement （of pleasure or displeasure in something） is not universally valid； but every one willingly refrains from imputing this agreement to others （despite the frequent actual prevalence of a considerable consensus of general opinion even in these judgements）； the taste of reflection； which； as experience teaches； has often enough to put up with a rude dismissal of its claims to universal validity of its judgement （upon the beautiful）； can （as it actually does） find it possible for all that to formulate judgements capable of demanding this agreement in its universality。 Such agreement it does in fact require from every one for each of its judgements of taste the persons who pass these judgements not quarreling over the possibility of such a claim； but only failing in particular cases to come to terms as to the correct application of this faculty。 First of all we have here to note that a universality which does not rest upon concepts of the object （even though these are only empirical） is in no way logical； but aesthetic； i。 e。； does not involve any objective quantity of the judgement； but only one that is subjective。 For this universality I use the expression general validity； which denotes the validity of the reference of a representation； not to the cognitive faculties； but to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure for every subject。 （The same expression； however； may also be employed for the logical quantity of the judgement； provided we add objective universal validity； to distinguish it from the merely subjective validity which is always aesthetic。） Now a judgement that has objective universal validity has always got the subjective also； i。e。； if the judgement is valid for everything which is contained under a given concept； it is valid also for all who represent an object by means of this concept。 But from a subjective universal validity； i。 e。； the aesthetic； that does not rest on any concept； no conclusion can be drawn to the logical； because judgements of that kind have no bearing upon the object。 But for this very reason the aesthetic universality attributed to a judgement must also be of a special kind； seeing that it does not join the predicate of beauty to the concept of the object taken in its entire logical sphere； and yet does extend this predicate over the whole sphere of judging subjects。 In their logical quantity； all judgements of taste are singular judgements。 For； since I must present the object immediately to my feeling of pleasure or displeasure； and that； too； without the aid of concepts； such judgements cannot have the quantity of judgements with objective general validity。 Yet by taking the singular representation of the object of the judgement of taste； and by comparison converting it into a concept according to the conditions determining that judgement； we can arrive at a logically universal judgement。 For instance； by a judgement of the taste I describe the rose at which I am looking as beautiful。 The judgement； on the other hand； resulting from the comparison of a number of singular representations： 〃Roses in general are beautiful；〃 is no longer pronounced as a purely aesthetic judgement； but as a logical judgement founded on one that is aesthetic。 Now the judgement； 〃The rose is agreeable〃 （to smell） is also； no doubt； an aesthetic and singular judgement； but then it is not one of taste but of sense。 For it has this point of difference from a judgement of taste； that the latter imports an aesthetic quantity of universality； i。e。； of validity for everyone which is not to be met with in a judgement upon the agreeable。 It is only judgements upon the good which； while also determining the delight in an object； possess logical and not mere aesthetic universality； for it is as involving a cognition of the object that 〃they are valid of it； and on that account valid for everyone。 In forming an estimate of objects merely from concepts； all representation of beauty goes b