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er and to a definite end。 For this reason there is no immediate delight whatever in their contemplation。 A flower； on the other hand； such as a tulip； is regarded as beautiful； because we meet with a certain finality in its perception； which； in our estimate of it； is not referred to any end whatever。
FOURTH MOMENT。 Of the Judgement of Taste： Moment of the Modality of the Delight in the Object。
SS 18。 Nature of the modality in a judgement of taste。
I may assert in the case of every representation that the synthesis of a pleasure with the representation （as a cognition） is at least possible。 Of what I call agreeable I assert that it actually causes pleasure in me。 But what we have in mind in the case of the beautiful is a necessary reference on its part to delight。 However； this necessity is of a special kind。 It is not a theoretical objective necessity…such as would let us cognize a priori that every one will feel this delight in the object that is called beautiful by me。 Nor yet is it a practical necessity； in which case； thanks to concepts of a pure rational will in which free agents are supplied with a rule； this delight is the necessary consequence of an objective law； and simply means that one ought absolutely （without ulterior object） to act in a certain way。 Rather； being such a necessity as is thought in an aesthetic judgement； it can only be termed exemplary。 In other words it is a necessity of the assent of all to a judgement regarded as exemplifying a universal rule incapable of formulation。 Since an aesthetic judgement is not an objective or cognitive judgement； this necessity is not derivable from definite concepts； and so is not apodeictic。 Much less is it inferable from universality of experience （of a thoroughgoing agreement of judgements about the beauty of a certain object）。 For； apart from the fact that experience would hardly furnish evidences sufficiently numerous for this purpose； empirical judgements do not afford any foundation for a concept of the necessity of these judgements。
SS 19。 The subjective necessity attributed to a judgement of taste is conditioned。
The judgement of taste exacts agreement from every one； and a person who describes something as beautiful insists that every one ought to give the object in question his approval and follow suit in describing it as beautiful。 The ought in aesthetic judgements； therefore； despite an accordance with all the requisite data for passing judgement； is still only pronounced conditionally。 We are suitors for agreement from every one else； because we are fortified with a ground common to all。 Further； we would be able to count on this agreement； provided we were always assured of the correct subsumption of the case under that ground as the rule of approval。
SS 20。 The condition of the necessity advanced by a judgement of taste is the idea of a common sense。
Were judgements of taste （like cognitive judgements） in possession of a definite objective principle； then one who in his judgement followed such a principle would claim unconditioned necessity for it。 Again； were they devoid of any principle； as are those of the mere taste of sense； then no thought of any necessity on their part would enter one's head。 Therefore they must have a subjective principle； and one which determines what pleases or displeases； by means of feeling only and not through concepts； but yet with universal validity。 Such a principle； however； could only be regarded as a common sense。 This differs essentially from common understanding； which is also sometimes called common sense （sensus communis）： for the judgement of the latter is not one by feeling； but always one by concepts； though usually only in the shape of obscurely represented principles。 The judgement of taste； therefore； depends on our presupposing the existence of a common sense。 （But this is not to be taken to mean some external sense； but the effect arising from the free play of our powers of cognition。） Only under the presupposition； I repeat； of such a common sense； are we able to lay down a judgement of taste。
SS 21。 Have we reason for presupposing a common sense？
Cognitions and judgements must； together with their attendant conviction； admit of being universally communicated； for otherwise a correspondence with the object would not be due to them。 They would be a conglomerate constituting a mere subjective play of the powers of representation； just as scepticism would have it。 But if cognitions are to admit of communication； then our mental state； i。e。； the way the cognitive powers are attuned for cognition generally； and； in fact； the relative proportion suitable for a representation （by which an object is given to us） from which cognition is to result； must also admit of being universally communicated； as； without this； which is the subjective condition of the act of knowing； knowledge； as an effect； would not arise。 And this is always what actually happens where a given object； through the intervention of sense； sets the imagination at work in arranging the manifold； and the imagination； in turn； the understanding in giving to this arrangement the unity of concepts。 But this disposition of the cognitive powers has a relative proportion differing with the diversity of the objects that are given。 However； there must be one in which this internal ratio suitable for quickening （one faculty by the other） is best adapted for both mental powers in respect of cognition （of given objects） generally； and this disposition can only be determined through feeling （and not by concepts）。 Since； now this disposition itself must admit of being universally communicated； and hence also the feeling of it （in the case of a given representation）； while again； the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense： it follows that our assumption of it is well founded。 And here； too； we do not have to take our stand on psychological observations； but we assume a common sense as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge； which is presupposed in every logic and every principle of knowledge that is not one of scepticism。
SS 22。 The necessity of the universal assent that is thought in a judgement of taste； is a subjective necessity which； under the presupposition of a common sense； is represented as objective。
In all judgements by which we describe anything as beautiful； we tolerate no one else being of a different opinion； and in taking up this position we do not rest our judgement upon concepts； but only on our feeling。 Accordingly we introduce this fundamental feeling not as a private feeling； but as a public sense。 Now； for this purpose； experience cannot be made the ground of this common sense； for the latter is invoked to justify judgements containing an 〃ought。〃 The assertion is not that every one will fall in with our judgement； but rather that every one ought to agree with it。 Here I put forward my judgement of taste as an example of the judgement of common sense； and attribute to it on that account exemplary validity。 Hence common sense is a mere ideal norm。 With this as presupposition； a judgement that accords with it； as well as the delight in an object expressed in that judgement； is rightly converted into a rule for everyone。 For the principle； while it is only subjective； being yet assumed as subjectively universal （a necessary idea for everyone）； could； in what concerns the consensus of different judging subjects； demand universal assent like an objective principle； provided we were assured of our subsumption under it being correct。 This indeterminate norm of a common sense is； as a matter of fact； presupposed by us； as is shown by our presuming to lay down judgements of taste。 But does such a common sense in fact exist as a constitutive principle of the possibility of experience； or is it formed for us as a regulative principle by a still higher principle of reason； that for higher ends first seeks to beget in us a common sense？ Is taste； in other words； a natural and original faculty； or is it only the idea of one that is artificial and to be acqu