按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
le Hence it is evident that a complex of practical precepts furnished by philosophy does not form a special part of philosophy； co…ordinate with the theoretical； by reason of its precepts being practical…for that they might be； notwithstanding that their principles were derived wholly from the theoretical knowledge of nature （as technically…practical rules）。 But an adequate reason only exists where their principle； being in no way borrowed from the concept of nature； which is always sensibly conditioned； rests consequently on the supersensible； which the concept of freedom alone makes cognizable by means of its formal laws； and where； therefore； they are morally…practical； i。 e。； not merely precepts and its and rules in this or that interest； but laws independent of all antecedent reference to ends or aims。
II。 The Realm of Philosophy in General。
The employment of our faculty of cognition from principles； and with it philosophy； is coextensive with the applicability of a priori concepts。 Now a division of the complex of all the objects to which those concepts are referred for the purpose； where possible； of compassing their knowledge； may be made according to the varied competence or incompetence of our faculty in that connection。 Concepts； so far as they are referred to objects apart from the question of whether knowledge of them is possible or not； have their field； which is determined simply by the relation in which their object stands to our faculty of cognition in general。 The part of this field in which knowledge is possible for us is a territory （territorium） for these concepts and the requisite cognitive faculty。 The part of the territory over which they exercise legislative authority is the realm （ditio） of these concepts； and their appropriate cognitive faculty。 Empirical concepts have； therefore； their territory； doubtless； in nature as the complex of all sensible objects； but they have no realm （only a dwelling…place； domicilium）； for； although they are formed according to law； they are not themselves legislative； but the rules founded on them are empirical and； consequently； contingent。 Our entire faculty of cognition has two realms； that of natural concepts and that of the concept of freedom； for through both it prescribes laws a priori。 In accordance with this distinction； then； philosophy is divisible into theoretical and practical。 But the territory upon which its realm is established； and over which it exercises its legislative authority； is still always confined to the complex of the objects of all possible experience； taken as no more than mere phenomena； for otherwise legislation by the understanding in respect of them is unthinkable。 The function of prescribing laws by means of concepts of nature is discharged by understanding and is theoretical。 That of prescribing laws by means of the concept of freedom is discharged by reason and is merely practical。 It is only in the practical sphere that reason can prescribe laws； in respect of theoretical knowledge （of nature） it can only （as by the understanding advised in the law） deduce from given logical consequences； which still always remain restricted to nature。 But we cannot reverse this and say that where rules are practical reason is then and there legislative； since the rules might be technically practical。 Understanding and reason； therefore； have two distinct jurisdictions over one and the same territory of experience。 But neither can interfere with the other。 For the concept of freedom just as little disturbs the legislation of nature； as the concept of nature influences legislation through the concept of freedom。 That it is possible for us at least to think without contradiction of both these jurisdictions； and their appropriate faculties； as co…existing in the same subject； was shown by the Critique of Pure Reason； since it disposed of the objections on the other side by detecting their dialectical illusion。 Still； how does it happen that these two different realms do not form one realm； seeing that； while they do not limit each other in their legislation； they continually do so in their effects in the sensible world？ The explanation lies in the fact that the concept of nature represents its objects in intuition doubtless； yet not as things in…themselves； but as mere phenomena； whereas the concept of freedom represents in its object what is no doubt a thing…in…itself； but it does not make it intuitable； and further that neither the one nor the other is capable； therefore； of furnishing a theoretical cognition of its object （or even of the thinking subject） as a thing…in…itself； or； as this would be； of the supersensible idea of which has certainly to be introduced as the basis of the possibility of all those objects of experience； although it cannot itself ever be elevated or extended into a cognition。 Our entire cognitive faculty is； therefore； presented with an unbounded； but； also； inaccessible field…the field of the supersensible…in which we seek in vain for a territory； and on which； therefore； we can have no realm for theoretical cognition； be it for concepts of understanding or of reason。 This field we must indeed occupy with ideas in the interest as well of the theoretical as the practical employment of reason； but； in connection with the laws arising from the concept of freedom； we cannot procure for these ideas any but practical reality； which； accordingly； fails to advance our theoretical cognition one step towards the supersensible。 Albeit； then； between the realm of the natural concept； as the sensible； and the realm of the concept of freedom； as the supersensible； there is a great gulf fixed； so that it is not possible to pass from the to the latter （by means of the theoretical employment of reason）； just as if they were so many separate worlds； the first of which is powerless to exercise influence on the second： still the latter is meant to influence the former…that is to say； the concept of freedom is meant to actualize in the sensible world the end proposed by its laws； and nature must consequently also be capable of being regarded in such a way that in the conformity to law of its form it at least harmonizes with the possibility of the ends to be effectuated in it according to the laws of freedom。 There must； therefore； be a ground of the unity of the supersensible that lies at the basis of nature； with what the concept of freedom contains in a practical way； and although the concept of this ground neither theoretically nor practically attains to a knowledge of it； and so has no peculiar realm of its own； still it renders possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other。
III。 The Critique of Judgement as a means of connecting the two Parts of Philosophy in a whole。
The critique which deals with what our cognitive faculties are capable of yielding a priori has properly speaking no realm in respect of objects； for it is not a doctrine； its sole business being to investigate whether； having regard to the general bearings of our faculties； a doctrine is possible by their means； and if so； how。 Its field extends to all their pretentions； with a view to confining them within their legitimate bounds。 But what is shut out of the division of philosophy may still be admitted as a principal part into the general critique of our faculty of pure cognition； in the event； namely； of its containing principles which are not in themselves available either for theoretical or practical employment。 Concepts of nature contain the ground of all theoretical cognition a priori and rest； as we saw； upon the legislative authority of understanding。 The concept of freedom contains the ground of all sensuously unconditioned practical precepts a priori； and rests upon that of reason。 Both faculties； therefore； besides their application in point of logical form to principles of whatever origin； have； in addition； their own peculiar jurisdiction in the matter of their content； and so； there being no further （a priori） jurisdiction above them； the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical