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rived of so excellent and gallant an officer。 He afterward settled in New Orleans as a lawyer； and died about 1867 or 1868。
On the 6th of April； my command； the Fifteenth Corps； was composed of three divisions：
The First Division； commanded by Major…General Fred Steele； and his three brigades by Colonel Manter； Colonel Charles R。 Wood； and Brigadier…General John M。 Thayer。
The Second Division； commanded by Major…General Frank P。 Blair； and his three brigades by Colonel Giles A。 Smith； Colonel Thomas gilby Smith； and Brigadier…General Hugh Ewing。
The Third Division； commanded by Brigadier…General J。 M。 Tuttle； and his three brigades by Brigadier…General R。 P。 Buckland； Colonel J。 A。 Mower； and Brigadier…General John E。 Smith。
My own staff then embraced： Dayton； McCoy； and Hill； aides； J。 H。 Hammond； assistant adjutant…general； Sanger； inspector…general； McFeeley； commissary； J。 Condit Smith； quartermaster； Charles McMillan； medical director； Ezra Taylor； chief of artillery； JNo。 C。 Neely； ordnance…officer； Jenney and Pitzman； engineers。
By this time it had become thoroughly demonstrated that we could not divert the main river Mississippi； or get practicable access to the east bank of the Yazoo； in the rear of Vicksburg； by any of the passes； and we were all in the habit of discussing the various chances of the future。 General Grant's headquarters were at Milliken's Bend； in tents； and his army was strung along the river all the way from Young's Point up to Lake Providence； at least sixty miles。 I had always contended that the best way to take Vicksburg was to resume the movement which had been so well begun the previous November； viz。； for the main army to march by land down the country inland of the Mississippi River； while the gunboat…fleet and a minor land…force should threaten Vicksburg on its river…front。
I reasoned that； with the large force then subject to General Grant's orders…viz。； four army corpshe could easily resume the movement from Memphis； by way of Oxford and Grenada； to Jackson； Mississippi； or down the ridge between the Yazoo and Big Black； but General Grant would not； for reasons other than military； take any course which looked like； a step backward； and he himself concluded on the river movement below Vicksburg； so as to appear like connecting with General Banks； who at the same time was besieging Port Hudson from the direction of New Orleans。
Preliminary orders had already been given； looking to the digging of a canal； to connect the river at Duckport with Willow Bayou； back of Milliken's Bend； so as to form a channel for the conveyance of supplies； by way of Richmond； to New Carthage； and several steam dredge…boats had come from the upper rivers to assist in the work。 One day early in April； I was up at General Grant's headquarters； and we talked over all these things with absolute freedom。 Charles A。 Dana； Assistant Secretary of War； was there； and Wilson； Rawlins； Frank Blair； McPherson； etc。 We all knew； what was notorious； that General MeClernand was still intriguing against General Grant； in hopes to regain the command of the whole expedition； and that others were raising a clamor against General Grant in the news papers at the North。 Even Mr。 Lincoln and General Halleck seemed to be shaken； but at no instant of time did we （his personal friends） slacken in our loyalty to him。 One night； after such a discussion； and believing that General McClernand had no real plan of action shaped in his mind； I wrote my letter of April 8； 1863； to Colonel Rawlins； which letter is embraced in full at page 616 of Badeau's book； and which I now reproduce here：
HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS； CAMP NEAR VICKSBURG； April 8；1868。
Colonel J。 A。 RAWLINS； Assistant Adjutant…General to General GRANT。
SIR： I would most respectfully suggest （for reasons which I will not name） that General Grant call on his corps commanders for their opinions； concise and positive； on the best general plan of a campaign。 Unless this be done； there are men who will； in any result falling below the popular standard； claim that their advice was unheeded； and that fatal consequence resulted therefrom。 My own opinions are：
First。 That the Army of the Tennessee is now far in advance of the other grand armies of the United States。
Second。 That a corps from Missouri should forthwith be moved from St。 Louis to the vicinity of Little Rock； Arkansas； supplies collected there while the river is full； and land communication with Memphis opened via Des Arc on the White； and Madison on the St。 Francis River。
Third。 That as much of the Yazoo Pass； Coldwater； and Tallahatchie Rivers； as can be gained and fortified； be held； and the main army be transported thither by land and water； that the road back to Memphis be secured and reopened； and； as soon as the waters subside； Grenada be attacked； and the swamp…road across to Helena be patrolled by cavalry。
Fourth。 That the line of the Yalabusha be the base from which to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central crosses Big Black； above Canton； and； lastly； where the Vicksburg & Jackson Railroad crosses the same river （Big Black）。 The capture of Vicksburg would result。
Fifth。 That a minor force be left in this vicinity； not to exceed ten thousand men； with only enough steamboats to float and transport them to any desired point； this force to be held always near enough to act with the gunboats when the main army is known to be near VicksburgHaines's Bluff or Yazoo City。
Sixth。 I do doubt the capacity of Willow Bayou （which I estimate to be fifty miles long and very tortuous） as a military channel； to supply an army large enough to operate against Jackson； Mississippi； or the Black River Bridge； and such a channel will be very vulnerable to a force coming from the west； which we must expect。 Yet this canal will be most useful as the way to convey coals and supplies to a fleet that should navigate the lower reach of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and the Red River。
Seventh。 The chief reason for operating solely by water was the season of the year and high water in the Tallahatchie and Yalabusha Rivers。 The spring is now here； and soon these streams will be no serious obstacle； save in the ambuscades of the forest； and whatever works the enemy may have erected at or near Grenada。 North Mississippi is too valuable for us to allow the enemy to hold it and make crops this year。
I make these suggestions； with the request that General Grant will read them and give them； as I know he will； a share of his thoughts。 I would prefer that he should not answer this letter； but merely give it as much or as little weight as it deserves。 Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from me the same zealous cooperation and energetic support as though conceived by myself。 I do not believe General Banks will make any serious attack on Port Hudson this spring。 I am； etc。；
W。 T。 SHERMAN； Major…General。
This is the letter which some critics have styled a 〃protest。〃 We never had a council of war at any time during the Vicksburg campaign。 We often met casually； regardless of rank or power； and talked and gossiped of things in general； as officers do and should。 But my letter speaks for itselfit shows my opinions clearly at that stage of the game； and was meant partially to induce General Grant to call on General McClernand for a similar expression of opinion； but； so far as I know； he did not。 He went on quietly to work out his own designs； and he has told me； since the war； that had we possessed in December； 1862； the experience of marching and maintaining armies without a regular base； which we afterward acquired； he would have gone on from Oxford as first contemplated； and would not have turned back because of the destruction of his depot at Holly Springs by Van Dorn。 The distance from Oxford to the rear of Vicksburg is little greater than by the circuitous route we afterward followed； from Bruinsburg to Jackson and Vicksburg； during which we had neither depot nor train of supplies。 I have never criticised General Grant's strategy on this or any other occasion； but I thought then that he had lost an opportunity； which cost him and