按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
so produce its movements。 We must urge the question whether it is these very same atoms which produce rest also…how they could do so； it is difficult and even impossible to say。 And； in general； we may object that it is not in this way that the soul appears to originate movement in animals…it is through intention or process of thinking。 It is in the same fashion that the Timaeus also tries to give a physical account of how the soul moves its body； the soul； it is there said； is in movement； and so owing to their mutual implication moves the body also。 After compounding the soul…substance out of the elements and dividing it in accordance with the harmonic numbers； in order that it may possess a connate sensibility for 'harmony' and that the whole may move in movements well attuned； the Demiurge bent the straight line into a circle； this single circle he divided into two circles united at two common points； one of these he subdivided into seven circles。 All this implies that the movements of the soul are identified with the local movements of the heavens。 Now； in the first place； it is a mistake to say that the soul is a spatial magnitude。 It is evident that Plato means the soul of the whole to be like the sort of soul which is called mind not like the sensitive or the desiderative soul； for the movements of neither of these are circular。 Now mind is one and continuous in the sense in which the process of thinking is so； and thinking is identical with the thoughts which are its parts； these have a serial unity like that of number； not a unity like that of a spatial magnitude。 Hence mind cannot have that kind of unity either； mind is either without parts or is continuous in some other way than that which characterizes a spatial magnitude。 How； indeed； if it were a spatial magnitude； could mind possibly think？ Will it think with any one indifferently of its parts？ In this case； the 'part' must be understood either in the sense of a spatial magnitude or in the sense of a point （if a point can be called a part of a spatial magnitude）。 If we accept the latter alternative； the points being infinite in number； obviously the mind can never exhaustively traverse them； if the former； the mind must think the same thing over and over again； indeed an infinite number of times （whereas it is manifestly possible to think a thing once only）。 If contact of any part whatsoever of itself with the object is all that is required； why need mind move in a circle； or indeed possess magnitude at all？ On the other hand； if contact with the whole circle is necessary； what meaning can be given to the contact of the parts？ Further； how could what has no parts think what has parts； or what has parts think what has none？ We must identify the circle referred to with mind； for it is mind whose movement is thinking； and it is the circle whose movement is revolution； so that if thinking is a movement of revolution； the circle which has this characteristic movement must be mind。 If the circular movement is eternal； there must be something which mind is always thinking…what can this be？ For all practical processes of thinking have limits…they all go on for the sake of something outside the process； and all theoretical processes come to a close in the same way as the phrases in speech which express processes and results of thinking。 Every such linguistic phrase is either definitory or demonstrative。 Demonstration has both a starting…point and may be said to end in a conclusion or inferred result； even if the process never reaches final completion； at any rate it never returns upon itself again to its starting…point； it goes on assuming a fresh middle term or a fresh extreme； and moves straight forward； but circular movement returns to its starting…point。 Definitions； too； are closed groups of terms。 Further； if the same revolution is repeated； mind must repeatedly think the same object。 Further； thinking has more resemblance to a coming to rest or arrest than to a movement； the same may be said of inferring。 It might also be urged that what is difficult and enforced is incompatible with blessedness； if the movement of the soul is not of its essence； movement of the soul must be contrary to its nature。 It must also be painful for the soul to be inextricably bound up with the body； nay more； if； as is frequently said and widely accepted； it is better for mind not to be embodied； the union must be for it undesirable。 Further； the cause of the revolution of the heavens is left obscure。 It is not the essence of soul which is the cause of this circular movement…that movement is only incidental to soul…nor is； a fortiori； the body its cause。 Again； it is not even asserted that it is better that soul should be so moved； and yet the reason for which God caused the soul to move in a circle can only have been that movement was better for it than rest； and movement of this kind better than any other。 But since this sort of consideration is more appropriate to another field of speculation； let us dismiss it for the present。 The view we have just been examining； in company with most theories about the soul； involves the following absurdity： they all join the soul to a body； or place it in a body； without adding any specification of the reason of their union； or of the bodily conditions required for it。 Yet such explanation can scarcely be omitted； for some community of nature is presupposed by the fact that the one acts and the other is acted upon； the one moves and the other is moved； interaction always implies a special nature in the two interagents。 All； however； that these thinkers do is to describe the specific characteristics of the soul； they do not try to determine anything about the body which is to contain it； as if it were possible； as in the Pythagorean myths； that any soul could be clothed upon with any body…an absurd view； for each body seems to have a form and shape of its own。 It is as absurd as to say that the art of carpentry could embody itself in flutes； each art must use its tools； each soul its body。
4
There is yet another theory about soul； which has commended itself to many as no less probable than any of those we have hitherto mentioned； and has rendered public account of itself in the court of popular discussion。 Its supporters say that the soul is a kind of harmony； for （a） harmony is a blend or composition of contraries； and （b） the body is compounded out of contraries。 Harmony； however； is a certain proportion or composition of the constituents blended； and soul can be neither the one nor the other of these。 Further； the power of originating movement cannot belong to a harmony； while almost all concur in regarding this as a principal attribute of soul。 It is more appropriate to call health （or generally one of the good states of the body） a harmony than to predicate it of the soul。 The absurdity becomes most apparent when we try to attribute the active and passive affections of the soul to a harmony； the necessary readjustment of their conceptions is difficult。 Further； in using the word 'harmony' we have one or other of two cases in our mind； the most proper sense is in relation to spatial magnitudes which have motion and position； where harmony means the disposition and cohesion of their parts in such a manner as to prevent the introduction into the whole of anything homogeneous with it； and the secondary sense； derived from the former； is that in which it means the ratio between the constituents so blended； in neither of these senses is it plausible to predicate it of soul。 That soul is a harmony in the sense of the mode of composition of the parts of the body is a view easily refutable； for there are many composite parts and those variously compounded； of what bodily part is mind or the sensitive or the appetitive faculty the mode of composition？ And what is the mode of composition which constitutes each of them？ It is equally absurd to identify the soul with the ratio of the mixture； for the mixture which makes flesh has a different ratio between the elements from that which makes bone。 The consequence of this view will therefore be that distributed throughout the whole body there will be many so