the critique of practical reason-第31章

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ther　the　supreme　（supremum）　or　the　perfect　（consummatum）。　The　former　is　that　condition　which　is　itself　unconditioned；　i。e。；　is　not　subordinate　to　any　other　（originarium）；　the　second　is　that　whole　which　is　not　a　part　of　a　greater　whole　of　the　same　kind　（perfectissimum）。　It　has　been　shown　in　the　Analytic　that　virtue　（as　worthiness　to　be　happy）　is　the　supreme　condition　of　all　that　can　appear　to　us　desirable；　and　consequently　of　all　our　pursuit　of　happiness；　and　is　therefore　the　supreme　good。　But　it　does　not　follow　that　it　is　the　whole　and　perfect　good　as　the　object　of　the　desires　of　rational　finite　beings；　for　this　requires　happiness　also；　and　that　not　merely　in　the　partial　eyes　of　the　person　who　makes　himself　an　end；　but　even　in　the　judgement　of　an　impartial　reason；　which　regards　persons　in　general　as　ends　in　themselves。　For　to　need　happiness；　to　deserve　it；　and　yet　at　the　same　time　not　to　participate　in　it；　cannot　be　consistent　with　the　perfect　volition　of　a　rational　being　possessed　at　the　same　time　of　all　power；　if；　for　the　sake　of　experiment；　we　conceive　such　a　being。　Now　inasmuch　as　virtue　and　happiness　together　constitute　the　possession　of　the　summum　bonum　in　a　person；　and　the　distribution　of　happiness　in　exact　proportion　to　morality　（which　is　the　worth　of　the　person；　and　his　worthiness　to　be　happy）　constitutes　the　summum　bonum　of　a　possible　world；　hence　this　summum　bonum　expresses　the　whole；　the　perfect　good；　in　which；　however；　virtue　as　the　condition　is　always　the　supreme　good；　since　it　has　no　condition　above　it；　whereas　happiness；　while　it　is　pleasant　to　the　possessor　of　it；　is　not　of　itself　absolutely　and　in　all　respects　good；　but　always　presupposes　morally　right　behaviour　as　its　condition。　　　When　two　elements　are　necessarily　united　in　one　concept；　they　must　be　connected　as　reason　and　consequence；　and　this　either　so　that　their　unity　is　considered　as　analytical　（logical　connection）；　or　as　synthetical　（real　connection）　the　former　following　the　law　of　identity；　the　latter　that　of　causality。　The　connection　of　virtue　and　happiness　may　therefore　be　understood　in　two　ways：　either　the　endeavour　to　be　virtuous　and　the　rational　pursuit　of　happiness　are　not　two　distinct　actions；　but　absolutely　identical；　in　which　case　no　maxim　need　be　made　the　principle　of　the　former；　other　than　what　serves　for　the　latter；　or　the　connection　consists　in　this；　that　virtue　produces　happiness　as　something　distinct　from　the　consciousness　of　virtue；　as　a　cause　produces　an　effect。　　　The　ancient　Greek　schools　were；　properly　speaking；　only　two；　and　in　determining　the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum　these　followed　in　fact　one　and　the　same　method；　inasmuch　as　they　did　not　allow　virtue　and　happiness　to　be　regarded　as　two　distinct　elements　of　the　summum　bonum；　and　consequently　sought　the　unity　of　the　principle　by　the　rule　of　identity；　but　they　differed　as　to　which　of　the　two　was　to　be　taken　as　the　fundamental　notion。　The　Epicurean　said：　〃To　be　conscious　that　one's　maxims　lead　to　happiness　is　virtue〃；　the　Stoic　said：　〃To　be　conscious　of　one's　virtue　is　happiness。〃　With　the　former；　Prudence　was　equivalent　to　morality；　with　the　latter；　who　chose　a　higher　designation　for　virtue；　morality　alone　was　true　wisdom。　　　While　we　must　admire　the　men　who　in　such　early　times　tried　all　imaginable　ways　of　extending　the　domain　of　philosophy；　we　must　at　the　same　time　lament　that　their　acuteness　was　unfortunately　misapplied　in　trying　to　trace　out　identity　between　two　extremely　heterogeneous　notions；　those　of　happiness　and　virtue。　But　it　agrees　with　the　dialectical　spirit　of　their　times　（and　subtle　minds　are　even　now　sometimes　misled　in　the　same　way）　to　get　rid　of　irreconcilable　differences　in　principle　by　seeking　to　change　them　into　a　mere　contest　about　words；　and　thus　apparently　working　out　the　identity　of　the　notion　under　different　names；　and　this　usually　occurs　in　cases　where　the　combination　of　heterogeneous　principles　lies　so　deep　or　so　high；　or　would　require　so　complete　a　transformation　of　the　doctrines　assumed　in　the　rest　of　the　philosophical　system；　that　men　are　afraid　to　penetrate　deeply　into　the　real　difference　and　prefer　treating　it　as　a　difference　in　questions　of　form。　　　While　both　schools　sought　to　trace　out　the　identity　of　the　practical　principles　of　virtue　and　happiness；　they　were　not　agreed　as　to　the　way　in　which　they　tried　to　force　this　identity；　but　were　separated　infinitely　from　one　another；　the　one　placing　its　principle　on　the　side　of　sense；　the　other　on　that　of　reason；　the　one　in　the　consciousness　of　sensible　wants；　the　other　in　the　independence　of　practical　reason　on　all　sensible　grounds　of　determination。　According　to　the　Epicurean；　the　notion　of　virtue　was　already　involved　in　the　maxim：　〃To　promote　one's　own　happiness〃；　according　to　the　Stoics；　on　the　other　hand；　the　feeling　of　happiness　was　already　contained　in　the　consciousness　of　virtue。　Now　whatever　is　contained　in　another　notion　is　identical　with　part　of　the　containing　notion；　but　not　with　the　whole；　and　moreover　two　wholes　may　be　specifically　distinct；　although　they　consist　of　the　same　parts；　namely　if　the　parts　are　united　into　a　whole　in　totally　different　ways。　The　Stoic　maintained　that　the　virtue　was　the　whole　summum　bonum；　and　happiness　only　the　consciousness　of　possessing　it；　as　making　part　of　the　state　of　the　subject。　The　Epicurean　maintained　that　happiness　was　the　whole　summum　bonum；　and　virtue　only　the　form　of　the　maxim　for　its　pursuit；　viz。；　the　rational　use　of　the　means　for　attaining　it。　　　Now　it　is　clear　from　the　Analytic　that　the　maxims　of　virtue　and　those　of　private　happiness　are　quite　heterogeneous　as　to　their　supreme　practical　principle；　and；　although　they　belong　to　one　summum　bonum　which　together　they　make　possible；　yet　they　are　so　far　from　coinciding　that　they　restrict　and　check　one　another　very　much　in　the　same　subject。　Thus　the　question：　〃How　is　the　summum　bonum　practically　possible？〃　still　remains　an　unsolved　problem；　notwithstanding　all　the　attempts　at　coalition　that　have　hitherto　been　made。　The　Analytic　has；　however；　shown　what　it　is　that　makes　the　problem　difficult　to　solve；　namely；　that　happiness　and　morality　are　two　specifically　distinct　elements　of　the　summum　bonum　and；　therefore；　their　combination　cannot　be　analytically　cognised　（as　if　the　man　that　seeks　his　own　happiness　should　find　by　mere　analysis　of　his　conception　that　in　so　acting　he　is　virtuous；　or　as　if　the　man　that　follows　virtue　should　in　the　consciousness　of　such　conduct　find　that　he　is　already　happy　ipso　facto）；　but　must　be　a　synthesis　of　concepts。　Now　since　this　combination　is　recognised　as　a　priori；　and　therefore　as　practically　necessary；　and　consequently　not　as　derived　from　experience；　so　that　the　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum　does　not　rest　on　any　empirical　principle；　it　follows　that　the　deduction　＇legitimation＇　of　this　concept　must　be　transcendental。　It　is　a　priori　（morally）　necessary　to　produce　the　summum　bonum　by　freedom　of　will：　therefore　the　condition　of　its　possibility　must　rest　solely　on　a　priori　principles　of　cognition。

　　　　　　　　　　I。　The　Antinomy　of　Practical　Reason。

　　In　the　summum　bonum　which　is　practical　for　us；　i。e。；　to　be　realized　by　our　will；　virtue　and　happiness　are　thought　as　necessarily　combined；　so　that　the　one　cannot　be　assumed　by　pure　practical　reason　without　the　other　also　being　attached　to　it。　Now　this　combination　（like　every　other）　is　either　analytical　or　synthetical。　It　bas　been　shown　that　it　cannot　be　analytical；　it　must　then　be　synthetical　and；　more　particularly；　must　be　conceived　as　the　connection　of　cause　and　effect；　since　it　concerns　a　practical　good；　i。e。；　one　that　is　possible　by　means　of　action；　consequently　either　the　desire　of　happiness　must　be　the　motive　to　maxims　of　virtue；　or　the　maxim　of　virtue　must　be　the　efficient　cause　of　happiness。　The　first　is　absolutely　impossible；　because　（as　was　proved　in　the　Analytic）　maxims　which　place　the　determining　principle　of　the　will　in　the　desire　of　personal　happiness　are　not　moral　at　all；　and　no　virtue　can　be　founded　on　them。　But　the　second　is　also　impossible；　because　the　practical　connection　of　causes　and　effects　in　the　world；　as　the　result　of　the　determination　of　the　will；　does　not　depend　upon　the　moral　dispositions　of　the　will；　but　on　the　kn