the critique of practical reason-第32章

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he　determination　of　the　will；　does　not　depend　upon　the　moral　dispositions　of　the　will；　but　on　the　knowledge　of　the　laws　of　nature　and　the　physical　power　to　use　them　for　one's　purposes；　consequently　we　cannot　expect　in　the　world　by　the　most　punctilious　observance　of　the　moral　laws　any　necessary　connection　of　happiness　with　virtue　adequate　to　the　summum　bonum。　Now；　as　the　promotion　of　this　summum　bonum；　the　conception　of　which　contains　this　connection；　is　a　priori　a　necessary　object　of　our　will　and　inseparably　attached　to　the　moral　law；　the　impossibility　of　the　former　must　prove　the　falsity　of　the　latter。　If　then　the　supreme　good　is　not　possible　by　practical　rules；　then　the　moral　law　also　which　commands　us　to　promote　it　is　directed　to　vain　imaginary　ends　and　must　consequently　be　false。

　　　II。　Critical　Solution　of　the　Antinomy　of　Practical　Reason。

　　The　antinomy　of　pure　speculative　reason　exhibits　a　similar　conflict　between　freedom　and　physical　necessity　in　the　causality　of　events　in　the　world。　It　was　solved　by　showing　that　there　is　no　real　contradiction　when　the　events　and　even　the　world　in　which　they　occur　are　regarded　（as　they　ought　to　be）　merely　as　appearances；　since　one　and　the　same　acting　being；　as　an　appearance　（even　to　his　own　inner　sense）；　has　a　causality　in　the　world　of　sense　that　always　conforms　to　the　mechanism　of　nature；　but　with　respect　to　the　same　events；　so　far　as　the　acting　person　regards　himself　at　the　same　time　as　a　noumenon　（as　pure　intelligence　in　an　existence　not　dependent　on　the　condition　of　time）；　he　can　contain　a　principle　by　which　that　causality　acting　according　to　laws　of　nature　is　determined；　but　which　is　itself　free　from　all　laws　of　nature。　　　It　is　just　the　same　with　the　foregoing　antinomy　of　pure　practical　reason。　The　first　of　the　two　propositions；　〃That　the　endeavour　after　happiness　produces　a　virtuous　mind；〃　is　absolutely　false；　but　the　second；　〃That　a　virtuous　mind　necessarily　produces　happiness；〃　is　not　absolutely　false；　but　only　in　so　far　as　virtue　is　considered　as　a　form　of　causality　in　the　sensible　world；　and　consequently　only　if　I　suppose　existence　in　it　to　be　the　only　sort　of　existence　of　a　rational　being；　it　is　then　only　conditionally　false。　But　as　I　am　not　only　justified　in　thinking　that　I　exist　also　as　a　noumenon　in　a　world　of　the　understanding；　but　even　have　in　the　moral　law　a　purely　intellectual　determining　principle　of　my　causality　（in　the　sensible　world）；　it　is　not　impossible　that　morality　of　mind　should　have　a　connection　as　cause　with　happiness　（as　an　effect　in　the　sensible　world）　if　not　immediate　yet　mediate　（viz。；　through　an　intelligent　author　of　nature）；　and　moreover　necessary；　while　in　a　system　of　nature　which　is　merely　an　object　of　the　senses；　this　combination　could　never　occur　except　contingently　and；　therefore；　could　not　suffice　for　the　summum　bonum。　　　Thus；　notwithstanding　this　seeming　conflict　of　practical　reason　with　itself；　the　summum　bonum；　which　is　the　necessary　supreme　end　of　a　will　morally　determined；　is　a　true　object　thereof；　for　it　is　practically　possible；　and　the　maxims　of　the　will　which　as　regards　their　matter　refer　to　it　have　objective　reality；　which　at　first　was　threatened　by　the　antinomy　that　appeared　in　the　connection　of　morality　with　happiness　by　a　general　law；　but　this　was　merely　from　a　misconception；　because　the　relation　between　appearances　was　taken　for　a　relation　of　the　things　in　themselves　to　these　appearances。　　　When　we　find　ourselves　obliged　to　go　so　far；　namely；　to　the　connection　with　an　intelligible　world；　to　find　the　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum；　which　reason　points　out　to　all　rational　beings　as　the　goal　of　all　their　moral　wishes；　it　must　seem　strange　that；　nevertheless；　the　philosophers　both　of　ancient　and　modern　times　have　been　able　to　find　happiness　in　accurate　proportion　to　virtue　even　in　this　life　（in　the　sensible　world）；　or　have　persuaded　themselves　that　they　were　conscious　thereof。　For　Epicurus　as　well　as　the　Stoics　extolled　above　everything　the　happiness　that　springs　from　the　consciousness　of　living　virtuously；　and　the　former　was　not　so　base　in　his　practical　precepts　as　one　might　infer　from　the　principles　of　his　theory；　which　he　used　for　explanation　and　not　for　action；　or　as　they　were　interpreted　by　many　who　were　misled　by　his　using　the　term　pleasure　for　contentment；　on　the　contrary；　he　reckoned　the　most　disinterested　practice　of　good　amongst　the　ways　of　enjoying　the　most　intimate　delight；　and　his　scheme　of　pleasure　（by　which　he　meant　constant　cheerfulness　of　mind）　included　the　moderation　and　control　of　the　inclinations；　such　as　the　strictest　moral　philosopher　might　require。　He　differed　from　the　Stoics　chiefly　in　making　this　pleasure　the　motive；　which　they　very　rightly　refused　to　do。　For；　on　the　one　hand；　the　virtuous　Epicurus；　like　many　well…intentioned　men　of　this　day　who　do　not　reflect　deeply　enough　on　their　principles；　fell　into　the　error　of　presupposing　the　virtuous　disposition　in　the　persons　for　whom　he　wished　to　provide　the　springs　to　virtue　（and　indeed　the　upright　man　cannot　be　happy　if　he　is　not　first　conscious　of　his　uprightness；　since　with　such　a　character　the　reproach　that　his　habit　of　thought　would　oblige　him　to　make　against　himself　in　case　of　transgression　and　his　moral　self…condemnation　would　rob　him　of　all　enjoyment　of　the　pleasantness　which　his　condition　might　otherwise　contain）。　But　the　question　is：　How　is　such　a　disposition　possible　in　the　first　instance；　and　such　a　habit　of　thought　in　estimating　the　worth　of　one's　existence；　since　prior　to　it　there　can　be　in　the　subject　no　feeling　at　all　for　moral　worth？　If　a　man　is　virtuous　without　being　conscious　of　his　integrity　in　every　action；　he　will　certainly　not　enjoy　life；　however　favourable　fortune　may　be　to　him　in　its　physical　circumstances；　but　can　we　make　him　virtuous　in　the　first　instance；　in　other　words；　before　he　esteems　the　moral　worth　of　his　existence　so　highly；　by　praising　to　him　the　peace　of　mind　that　would　result　from　the　consciousness　of　an　integrity　for　which　he　has　no　sense？　　　On　the　other　hand；　however；　there　is　here　an　occasion　of　a　vitium　subreptionis；　and　as　it　were　of　an　optical　illusion；　in　the　self…consciousness　of　what　one　does　as　distinguished　from　what　one　feels…　an　illusion　which　even　the　most　experienced　cannot　altogether　avoid。　The　moral　disposition　of　mind　is　necessarily　combined　with　a　consciousness　that　the　will　is　determined　directly　by　the　law。　Now　the　consciousness　of　a　determination　of　the　faculty　of　desire　is　always　the　source　of　a　satisfaction　in　the　resulting　action；　but　this　pleasure；　this　satisfaction　in　oneself；　is　not　the　determining　principle　of　the　action；　on　the　contrary；　the　determination　of　the　will　directly　by　reason　is　the　source　of　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　and　this　remains　a　pure　practical　not　sensible　determination　of　the　faculty　of　desire。　Now　as　this　determination　has　exactly　the　same　effect　within　in　impelling　to　activity；　that　a　feeling　of　the　pleasure　to　be　expected　from　the　desired　action　would　have　had；　we　easily　look　on　what　we　ourselves　do　as　something　which　we　merely　passively　feel；　and　take　the　moral　spring　for　a　sensible　impulse；　just　as　it　happens　in　the　so…called　illusion　of　the　senses　（in　this　case　the　inner　sense）。　It　is　a　sublime　thing　in　human　nature　to　be　determined　to　actions　immediately　by　a　purely　rational　law；　sublime　even　is　the　illusion　that　regards　the　subjective　side　of　this　capacity　of　intellectual　determination　as　something　sensible　and　the　effect　of　a　special　sensible　feeling　（for　an　intellectual　feeling　would　be　a　contradiction）。　It　is　also　of　great　importance　to　attend　to　this　property　of　our　personality　and　as　much　as　possible　to　cultivate　the　effect　of　reason　on　this　feeling。　But　we　must　beware　lest　by　falsely　extolling　this　moral　determining　principle　as　a　spring；　making　its　source　lie　in　particular　feelings　of　pleasure　（which　are　in　fact　only　results）；　we　degrade　and　disfigure　the　true　genuine　spring；　the　law　itself；　by　putting　as　it　were　a　false　foil　upon　it。　Respect；　not　pleasure　or　enjoyment　of　happiness；　is　something　for　which　it　is　not　possible　that　reason　should　have　any　antecedent　feeling　as　its　foundation　（for　this　would　always　be　sensible　and　pathological）；　and　consciousness　of　immedia