按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
gratifications…this is a view to which reason will never let itself be brought round。 Only by what a man does heedless of enjoyment； in complete freedom； and independently of what he can procure passively from the hand of nature； does be give to his existence； as the real existence of a person； an absolute worth。 Happiness； with all its plethora of pleasures； is far from being an unconditioned good。*
*An obligation to enjoyment is a patent absurdity。 And the same； then； must also be said of a supposed obligation to actions that have merely enjoyment for their aim； no matter how spiritually this enjoyment may be refined in thought （or embellished）； and even if it be a mystical； so…called heavenly； enjoyment。
But； despite all this difference between the agreeable and the good； they both agree in being invariably coupled with an interest in their object。 This is true； not alone of the agreeable； SS 3； and of the mediately good； i； e。； the useful； which pleases as a means to some pleasure； but also of that which is good absolutely and from every point of view； namely the moral good which carries with it the highest interest。 For the good is the object of will； i。 e。； of a rationally determined faculty of desire）。 But to will something； and to take a delight in its existence； i。e。； to take an interest in it； are identical。
SS 5。 Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of delight。
Both the agreeable and the good involve a reference to the faculty of desire； and are thus attended； the former with a delight pathologically conditioned （by stimuli）； the latter with a pure practical delight。 Such delight is determined not merely by the representation of the object； but also by the represented bond of connection between the subject and the real existence of the object。 It is not merely the object； but also its real existence； that pleases。 On the other hand； the judgement of taste is simply contemplative； i。 e。； it is a judgement which is indifferent as to the existence of an object； and only decides how its character stands with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure。 But not even is this contemplation itself directed to concepts； for the judgement of taste is not a cognitive judgement （neither a theoretical one nor a practical）； and hence； also； is not grounded on concepts； nor yet intentionally directed to them。 The agreeable； the beautiful； and the good thus denote three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure； as a feeling in respect of which we distinguish different objects or modes of representation。 Also； the corresponding expressions which indicate our satisfaction in them are different The agreeable is what GRATIFIES a man； the beautiful what simply PLEASES him； the good what is ESTEEMED （approved）； i。e。； that on which he sets an objective worth。 Agreeableness is a significant factor even with irrational animals； beauty has purport and significance only for human beings； i。e。； for beings at once animal and rational （but not merely for them as rational…intelligent beings…but only for them as at once animal and rational）； whereas the good is good for every rational being in general…a proposition which can only receive its complete justification and explanation in the sequel。 Of all these three kinds of delight； that of taste in the beautiful may be said to be the one and only disinterested and free delight； for； with it； no interest； whether of sense or reason； extorts approval。 And so we may say that delight； in the three cases mentioned； is related to inclination； to favour； or to respect。 For FAVOUR is the only free liking。 An object of inclination； and one which a law of reason imposes upon our desire； leaves us no freedom to turn anything into an object of pleasure。 All interest presupposes a want； or calls one forth； and； being a ground determining approval； deprives the judgement on the object of its freedom。 So far as the interest of inclination in the case of the agreeable goes； every one says 〃Hunger is the best sauce； and people with a healthy appetite relish everything； so long as it is something they can eat。〃 Such delight； consequently； gives no indication of taste having anything to say to the choice。 Only when men have got all they want can we tell who among the crowd has taste or not。 Similarly there may be correct habits （conduct） without virtue； politeness without good…will； propriety without honour； etc。 For where the moral law dictates； there is； objectively； no room left for free choice as to what one has to do； and to show taste in the way one carries out these dictates； or in estimating the way others do so； is a totally different matter from displaying the moral frame of one's mind。 For the latter involves a command and produces a need of something； whereas moral taste only plays with the objects of delight without devoting itself sincerely to any。
Definition of the Beautiful derived from the First Moment。
Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or aversion apart from any interest。 The object of such a delight is called beautiful。
SECOND MOMENT。 Of the Judgement of Taste： Moment of Quantity。
SS 6。 The beautiful is that which； apart from concepts； is represented as the Object of a universal delight。
This definition of the beautiful is deducible from the foregoing definition of it as an object of delight apart from any interest。 For where any one is conscious that his delight in an object is with him independent of interest； it is inevitable that he should look on the object as one containing a ground of delight for all men。 For； since the delight is not based on any inclination of the subject （or on any other deliberate interest）； but the subject feels himself completely free in respect of the liking which he accords to the object； he can find as reason for his delight no personal conditions to which his own subjective self might alone be party。 Hence he must regard it as resting on what he may also presuppose in every other person； and therefore he must believe that he has reason for demanding a similar delight from every one。 Accordingly he will speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a quality of the object and the judgement logical （forming a cognition of the object by concepts of it）； although it is only aesthetic； and contains merely a reference of the representation of the object to the subject； because it still bears this resemblance to the logical judgement； that it may be presupposed to be valid for all men。 But this universality cannot spring from concepts。 For from concepts there is no transition to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure （save in the case of pure practical laws； which； however； carry an interest with them； and such an interest does not attach to the pure judgement of taste）。 The result is that the judgement of taste； with its attendant consciousness of detachment from all interest； must involve a claim to validity for all men； and must do so apart from universality attached to objects； i。e。； there must be coupled with it a claim to subjective universality。
SS 7。 Comparison of the beautiful with the agreeable and the good by means of the above characteristic。
As regards the agreeable； every one concedes that his judgement； which he bases on a private feeling； and in which he declares that an object pleases him； is restricted merely to himself personally。 Thus he does not take it amiss if； when he says that Canary…wine is agreeable； another corrects the expression and reminds him that he ought to say： 〃It is agreeable to me。〃 This applies not only to the taste of the tongue； the palate； and the throat； but to what may with any one be agreeable to eye or ear。 A violet colour is to one soft and lovely： to another dull and faded。 One man likes the tone of wind instruments； another prefers that of string instruments。 To quarrel over such points with the idea of condemning another's judgement as incorrect when it differs from our own； as if the opposition between the two judgements were logical； would be folly。 With the agre