the critique of judgement-第39章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


　give　him　credit　for　a　beautiful　soul；　to　which　no　connoisseur　or　art　collector　can　lay　claim　on　the　score　of　the　interest　which　his　objects　have　for　him。　Here；　now；　are　two　kinds　of　objects　which　in　the　judgement　of　mere　taste　could　scarcely　contend　with　one　another　for　a　superiority。　What　then；　is　the　distinction　that　makes　us　hold　them　in　such　different　esteem？　　　We　have　a　faculty　of　judgement　which　is　merely　aesthetic…a　faculty　of　judging　of　forms　without　the　aid　of　concepts；　and　of　finding；　in　the　mere　estimate　of　them；　a　delight　that　we　at　the　same　time　make　into　a　rule　for　every　one；　without　this　judgement　being　founded　on　an　interest；　or　yet　producing　one。　On　the　other　hand；　we　have　also　a　faculty　of　intellectual　judgement　for　the　mere　forms　of　practical　maxims　（so　far　as　they　are　of　themselves　qualified　for　universal　legislation）…a　faculty　of　determining　an　a　priori　delight；　which　we　make　into　a　law　for　everyone；　without　our　judgement　being　founded　on　any　interest；　though　here　it　produces　one。　The　pleasure　or　displeasure　in　the　former　judgement　is　called　that　of　taste；　the　latter　is　called　that　of　the　moral　feeling。　　　But；　now；　reason　is　further　interested　in　ideas　（for　which　in　our　moral　feeling　it　brings　about　an　immediate　interest）；　having　also　objective　reality。　That　is　to　say；　it　is　of　interest　to　reason　that　nature　should　at　least　show　a　trace　or　give　a　hint　that　it　contains　in　itself　some　ground　or　other　for　assuming　a　uniform　accordance　of　its　products　with　our　wholly　disinterested　delight　（a　delight　which　we　cognize…a　priori　as　a　law　for　every　one　without　being　able　to　ground　it　upon　proofs）。　That　being　so；　reason　must　take　an　interest　in　every　manifestation　on　the　part　of　nature　of　some　such　accordance。　Hence　the　mind　cannot　reflect　on　the　beauty　of　nature　without　at　the　same　time　finding　its　interest　engaged。　But　this　interest　is　akin　to　the　moral。　One；　then；　who　takes　such　an　interest　in　the　beautiful　in　nature　can　only　do　so　in　so　far　as　he　has　previously　set　his　interest　deep　in　the　foundations　of　the　morally　good。　On　these　grounds　we　have　reason　for　presuming　the　presence　of　at　least　the　germ　of　a　good　moral　disposition　in　the　case　of　a　man　to　whom　the　beauty　of　nature　is　a　matter　of　immediate　interest。　　　It　will　be　said　that　this　interpretation　of　aesthetic　judgements　on　the　basis　of　kinship　with　our　moral　feeling　has　far　too　studied　an　appearance　to　be　accepted　as　the　true　construction　of　the　cypher　in　which　nature　speaks　to　us　figuratively　in　its　beautiful　forms。　But；　first　of　all；　this　immediate　interest　in　the　beauty　of　nature　is　not　in　fact　common。　It　is　peculiar　to　those　whose　habits　of　thought　are　already　trained　to　the　good　or　else　are　eminently　susceptible　of　such　training；　and　under　the　circumstances　the　analogy　in　which　the　pure　judgement　of　taste　that；　without　relying　upon　any　interest；　gives　us　a　feeling　of　delight；　and　at　the　same　time　represents　it　a　priori　as　proper　to　mankind　in　general；　stands　to　the　moral　judgement　that　does　just　the　same　from　concepts；　is　one　which；　without　any　clear；　subtle；　and　deliberate　reflection；　conduces　to　a　like　immediate　interest　being　taken　in　the　objects　of　the　former　judgement　as　in　those　of　the　latter…with　this　one　difference；　that　the　interest　in　the　first　case　is　free；　while　in　the　latter　it　is　one　founded　on　objective　laws。　In　addition　to　this；　there　is　our　admiration　of　Nature；　which　in　her　beautiful　products　displays　herself　as　art；　not　as　mere　matter　of　chance；　but；　as　it　were；　designedly；　according　to　a　law…directed　arrangement；　and　as　finality　apart　from　any　end。　As　we　never　meet　with　such　an　end　outside　ourselves；　we　naturally　look　for　it　in　ourselves；　and；　in　fact；　in　that　which　constitutes　the　ultimate　end　of　our　existence…the　moral　side　of　our　being。　（The　inquiry　into　the　ground　of　the　possibility　of　such　a　natural　finality　will；　however；　first　come　under　discussion　in　the　Teleology。）　　　The　fact　that　the　delight　in　beautiful　art　does　not；　in　the　pure　judgement　of　taste；　involve　an　immediate　interest；　as　does　that　in　beautiful　nature；　may　be　readily　explained。　For　the　former　is　either　such　an　imitation　of　the　latter　as　goes　the　length　of　deceiving　us；　in　which　case　it　acts　upon　us　in　the　character　of　a　natural　beauty；　which　we　take　it　to　be；　or　else　it　is　an　intentional　art　obviously　directed　to　our　delight。　In　the　latter　case；　however；　the　delight　in　the　product　would；　it　is　true；　be　brought　about　immediately　by　taste；　but　there　would　be　nothing　but　a　mediate　interest　in　the　cause　that　lay　beneath…an　interest；　namely；　in　an　art　only　capable　of　interesting　by　its　end；　and　never　in　itself。　It　will；　perhaps；　be　said　that　this　is　also　the　case　where　an　object　of　nature　only　interests　by　its　beauty　so　far　as　a　moral　idea　is　brought　into　partnership　therewith。　But　it　is　not　the　object　that　is　of　immediate　interest；　but　rather　the　inherent　character　of　the　beauty　qualifying　it　for　such　a　partnership…a　character；　therefore；　that　belongs　to　the　very　essence　of　beauty。　　　The　charms　in　natural　beauty；　which　are　to　be　found　blended；　as　it　were；　so　frequently　with　beauty　of　form；　belong　either　to　the　modifications　of　light　（in　colouring）　or　of　sound　（in　tones）。　For　these　are　the　only　sensations　which　permit　not　merely　of　a　feeling　of　the　senses；　but　also　of　reflection　upon　the　form　of　these　modifications　of　sense；　and　so　embody　as　it　were　a　language　in　which　nature　speaks　to　us　and　which　has　the　semblance　of　a　higher　meaning。　Thus　the　white　colour　of　the　lily　seems　to　dispose　the　mind　to　ideas　of　innocence；　and　the　other　seven　colours；　following　the　series　from　the　red　to　the　violet；　similarly　to　ideas　of　（1）　sublimity；　（2）　courage；　（3）　candour；　（4）　amiability；　（5）　modesty；　（6）　constancy；　（7）　tenderness。　The　bird's　song　tells　of　joyousness　and　contentment　with　its　existence。　At　least　so　we　interpret　nature…whether　such　be　its　purpose　or　not。　But　it　is　the　indispensable　requisite　of　the　interest　which　we　here　take　in　beauty；　that　the　beauty　should　be　that　of　nature；　and　it　vanishes　completely　as　soon　as　we　are　conscious　of　having　been　deceived；　and　that　it　is　only　the　work　of　art…so　completely　that　even　taste　can　then　no　longer　find　in　it　anything　beautiful　nor　sight　anything　attractive。　What　do　poets　set　more　store　on　than　the　nightingale's　bewitching　and　beautiful　note；　in　a　lonely　thicket　on　a　still　summer　evening　by　the　soft　light　of　the　moon？　And　yet　we　have　instances　of　how；　where　no　such　songster　was　to　be　found；　a　jovial　host　has　played　a　trick　on　the　guests　with　him　on　a　visit　to　enjoy　the　country　air；　and　has　done　so　to　their　huge　satisfaction；　by　biding　in　a　thicket　a　rogue　of　a　youth　who　（with　a　reed　or　rush　in　his　mouth）　knew　how　to　reproduce　this　note　so　as　to　hit　off　nature　to　perfection。　But　the　instant　one　realizes　that　it　is　all　a　fraud　no　one　will　long　endure　listening　to　this　song　that　before　was　regarded　as　so　attractive。　And　it　is　just　the　same　with　the　song　of　any　other　bird。　It　must　be　nature；　or　be　mistaken　by　us　for　nature；　to　enable　us　to　take　an　immediate　interest　in　the　beautiful　as　such；　and　this　is　all　the　more　so　if　we　can　even　call　upon　others　to　take　a　similar　interest。　And　such　a　demand　we　do　in　fact　make；　since　we　regard　as　coarse　and　low　the　habits　of　thought　of　those　who　have　no　feeling　for　beautiful　nature　（for　this　is　the　word　we　use　for　susceptibility　to　an　interest　in　the　contemplation　of　beautiful　nature）；　and　who　devote　themselves　to　the　mere　enjoyments　of　sense　found　in　eating　and　drinking。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　43。　Art　in　general。

　　（1。）　Art　is　distinguished　from　nature　as　making　（facere）　is　from　acting　or　operating　in　general　（agere）；　and　the　product　or　the　result　of　the　former　is　distinguished　from　that　of　the　latter　as　work　（opus）　from　operation　（effectus）。　　　By　right　it　is　only　production　through　freedom；　i。e。；　through　an　act　of　will　that　places　reason　at　the　basis　of　its　action；　that　should　be　termed　art。　For；　although　we　are　pleased　to　call　what　bees　produce　（their　regularly　constituted　cells）　a　work　of　art；　we　only　do　so　on　the　strength　of　an　analogy　with　art；　that　is　to　say；　as　soon　as　we　call　to　mind　that　no　rational　deliberation　forms　the　basis　of　their　labour；　we　say　at　once　that　it　is　a　product　of　th